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ABSTRACT 
 
Can we be creative without an in-depth understanding of the tools we            
use? It is unlikely, I argue. In relation to digital art practices,            
the tacit assumption that technology enables a creative practice         
without a problematisation of its inner mechanics, e.g. code, leaves          
the door open to forms of epistemological positivism in which          
technology is left leading art discourses in an auto-referential         
manner - subjugating the self to the objectifying forces of          
technology. In this article, I propose that a way forward to the            
re-appropriation of the self in relation to technology and our own           
creative practice is offered by interpreting digital art practices         
as a Foucaultian problematisation of the self through an ethos          
inspired by the Greek precept of the care of the self. Net.Art, as             
will be shown, has already engaged with such ethos (likely without           
knowing it). An outline of such an approach and a critique of some             
of the consequences it bares is offered. A controversial one (to           
some) is probably that digital art practitioners must also be, or           
become in the process, confident technologists (e.g. coders). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1 
 
There is no efficiency, no elegance. Very few masterpieces         
are ever written these days. Contemporary, off-the-shelf       
software is not inspiring at all. (Bentley 2003) 
 
The premises of this article, I fear, are grounded on frustration,           
enslavement and the silent death of creative energies. Such is,          
for the most part, my personal relationship with technology as an           
artist, or, if you concede me, as one whose creative efforts are            
made through the use of technological tools. Formerly a student of           
classical guitar, I have approached the realm of art and          
technology to free myself from the limitations imposed by         
traditional instruments (initially in relation to sounds), moved        
by a desire to expand and explore the, or rather what back then             
appeared to be 
”the many” possibilities offered by technology. With some        
variations, this rather short autobiographical account is likely        
to be familiar to the many who, like me, failed to resist at some              
point in their lives a fascination for technology and its          
extraordinary ability to expand one’s tool palette. 
Almost two decades have passed and I can now proudly claim to be a              
confident technologist. Not only I can use a wealth of specialised           
software for audio and video manipulation, but can also code in           
almost any language that would best serve my purposes. And yet it            
feels as if these technical skills acquired, albeit not developed          
in the absence of rigorous artistic and humanities studies, did          
not contribute to the development or discovery of real (personal)          
artistic interests. Neither do I intend to imply that I have           
finally gained a knowledge of technology in its entirety - rather,           
that the knowledge of technology achieved so far, of whatever          
magnitude it may be, appears to have added little to my true and             
honest artistic ends and outcomes. 
In concise terms, the main issue at stake can be summarised as a             
power struggle between objectifying forces and subjective       
necessities. The former exerted by technology while the latter can          
otherwise be said to be the artist’s urge to find his distinctive            
character, aka ”signature”, without which the entire personal        
life-art-project is destined to fail. 
 
 
2 Premises 
 
For us, software art is opposed to the notion of software           
as a tool; not because we would want to differentiate some           
kind of high art from some kind of low craftsmanship of           
programming. Instead, software art has the potential to        
make us aware that digital code is not harmless, that it           
is not restricted to simulations of other tools, and that          
is itself a ground for creative practice. (Cramer 2001) 
 
Technology’s domain knowledge has become so vast that in its          
entirety it is out of grasp for a single person alone. The coding             
involved in the development of an operating system, for example,          
requires such a diverse collection of highly specialised knowledge         
that the results, composed of millions of lines of code, become           
unreadable even to their own creators; Users of any software are           
not extraneous to this problem either. The staggering number of          
functions and dependencies making up a software, built to appeal          
to the largest number of consumers and their different needs,          
collides with the inevitable tendency of individuals to remember         
only those few that they use more often. As users, we becomes            
rubbish scavengers in search of the very few things we do really            
need and understand. From this point of view, the distinction          
between a user and a creator of technology is useful but,           
nevertheless, weak since establishing at which point this        
separation occurs is difficult. The complexity of the IT sector          
forces anyone to rely on, and therefore use, the work of others            
because IT itself is built on, and sustained by, the results a of             
societal effort accumulated over time (and space too). No matter          
what we do with technology we always rely on, and therefore use,            
the work of someone-else (whether dead or alive). This fact          
precludes us systematically from an understanding and full        
ownership of the tool we use. 
 
In this context, and more specifically within digital art         
practices, one may wonder how could anyone be creative without          
knowing-owning the tools through which one’s creativity is        
channeled. With ’knowing-owning’ I mean not exclusively the        
knowledge concerning the use of a software but also an in-depth           
understanding of the underlying mechanics that makes the        
software’s existence possible as artifact/tool (i.e. code,       
hardware, abstractions etc.). The doubt is a reasonable one.         
Consider the following: does a painter need to know how a brush is             
made or just how to use it? The accustomed thinker would promptly            
answer ”both!” and I would agree too. Knowing how a brush is made             
implies knowing about the materials required for its construction,         
the shape and form that allow for good hand grip and balance. This             
knowledge, in turn, enables informed choices that facilitate the         
achievement of individual objectives through personal styles and        
methodologies (i.e. the realisation of the art object). Leonardo         
da Vinci, for example, started his apprenticeship in the studio of           
Andrea del Verrocchio by first devoting himself to simple         
housekeeping duties but soon engaging in the making of paints,          
brushes and canvases. This type of training, practically mandatory         
to all artists for centuries, was therefore preparatory, and         
fundamentally so, to their later work as painters. 
Allow me to digress momentarily with a further example concerning          
the making of the colour blue ultramarine for Leonardo’s Vergine          
Delle Rocce. This colour was obtained by manually grinding lapis          
lazuli and mixing it with waxes, resins and oils on a lye solution             
(Cennino 1500 ca., 36-39). That was generally the work of the           
apprentice. Except for the lapis lazuli, the ingredients were         
ready available from the local druggist (a precursor of our modern           
pharmacist). In turn, the druggist had his own network of          
suppliers. Wax, resins and oils were easily obtainable and we can           
imagine that the supply chain did not extend too much further           
beyond. Lapis lazuli, instead, was a stone imported from the          
middle east or far east. It was less available, in high demand            
(used by jewelers too as precious stone) and thus very expensive.           
Slaves, miners, traders, sailors were all part of this supply          
chain. Overall, relative to the complexity of today’s ones, the          
supply chain was quite simple and while the process of making the            
blue ultramarine was quite standardised (Cennino 1500 ca.), the         
artist, his studio collaborators and apprentices needed to own         
that knowledge which ultimately forced them into what today would          
be called a research and development process: druggist A had a           
better pine rosine than druggist B who is furnished by farmer C;            
increasing slightly the quantity of wax would create a shiner          
tone; this lapis lazuli stone is richer in blue than the others;            
so on and so forth. This process lead to personalisation,          
virtuosity, distinctiveness of the artist and reflected immensely        
on the final artwork. 
In modern times, artists/painters are very rarely the makers of          
their own colours, for the artists simply go to their local shop            
to buy ready-made colour tubes. The experimentation process        
happens subsequently in that pre-made colours (a finite list of          
them created by market’s demand) can be mixed. Beneath the          
apparent simplicity of this supply chain lies a huge degree of           
complexity. The colour industry is a highly sophisticated sector         
requiring specialised engineering and chemistry knowledge. Most       
colours are nowadays produced synthetically in dedicated       
facilities (including the blue marine). Facilities that are, in         
turn, connected with a vast and intricate web of suppliers and           
subcontractors each owning specialised knowledge concerning a       
little but necessary step of the overall process. Yet, this          
complexity is foreign to the artists who simply select from a list            
of ready-made colours offered by a multitude of brands. By being           
relegated to the sole role of consumers, it is easy to see how in              
comparison to Leonardo’s times, the room for in-house        
experimentation is greatly reduced. A similar comparison can be         
brought about in the music domain where the ’distance’ between the           
liuther and the musician has increased to the point of often           
disintegrating as we get closer to present times. 
Drawing from the above account, the relationship of the digital          
artist with their tools seems to match more closely the modern           
painter than the renaissance one. However, the complexity of the          
supply chain is, in this case, by-far greater than any other (or            
at least than the ones we have been concerned with here) and of a              
magnitude that forces anyone to depend on a great deal of           
knowledge by others over which personal control/ownership, argued        
to be necessary to the achievement of subjective necessities, is          
difficult to achieve (especially in the case of        
proprietary/close-source software). One should consider hardware      
in addition to software. Behind the making of a computer there is            
a large number of actors each contributing to the development of           
input devices (e.g. mouse, keyboard and microphone), output        
devices (i.e. speakers and monitors), primary storage devices        
(e.g. CPU, RAM, video card) and secondary storage devices (i.e.          
hard disk). Considering the amount of parts required for each of           
the above devices, the final number of variables to choose from           
for a do-it-yourself computer project starting from the making of          
each component would be immense and almost impossible in its          
endeavour. Should we each time question how the inner mechanisms          
of a transistor shape of our relationship to technology? Of course           
not. The point is that a constant management and reworking of such            
large number of variables is not logistically nor financially         
viable for the industry itself neither and that is why the           
information technology sector is particularly prone to       
standardisation processes. 
It is indeed within this standardisation processes that technology         
exerts its objectifying force. Standardisation becomes a means to         
subjugate individuality. A means to the fulfillment of        
technology’s objectives and not individual ones. By doing so,         
technology creates homogeneous landscapes that erode from       
adventurous and dangerous treks where creativity and individuality        
are more likely to be found and fostered. In doing so, technology            
displays a way of loving and hating art similar to the way in             
which it has been loved and hated by any authoritarian regime. It            
displays love if it helps promoting and perpetrating technology         
(that is, the regime); it display hate for anything else, and most            
especially towards potentially non-aligned practices. 
Bense’s information aesthetic (Bense 1965), for example, serves        
technology’s objectives well by considering aesthetic values as        
measurable quantities; a perspective that that brings art closer         
to principles on which technology is grounded: rules and measures.          
Most art inspired by artificial intelligence algorithms presents        
similar problematics in that it is often interpreted with         
perspectives that adulate technology and its processes rather than         
anything else. To draw from the previous example, it would be as            
if brushes would occupy the entire aesthetic discussion in         
relation to painted works. 
On the other hand, we have aesthetic approaches that focus on the            
effects or results of an object of art. Stage is taken by            
discourse on the ways audience is affected, interact, responds,         
dialogue with the work. Yet, I argue, in this case too the            
discussion appears to be oblivious of technology’s ability to mask          
individuality in order to redraw attention onto itself. It is as           
if there is always one unnameable author for every digital artwork           
created: technology. An oblivion, I argue, suffered first and         
foremost by the artists themselves, no matter if competent         
technologists or not. It is indeed not the artist to avail of            
technology as a technical resource but, quite the opposite,         
technology that makes artists a technical resource for itself by          
reducing them to rule followers or, as Kant would have said, ”a            
cog in a machine”. This is ”obedience to technological reasons”          
(Mules 2012, 2). 
 
  
3 Proposal 
 
Out of this bleak scenario I wish to suggest one way, albeit I do              
not claim it is the only one, in which, as digital artist, we can              
revert our own subjugation to the objectifying forces of         
technology. This path entails a conduct inspired by the Foucault’s          
aesthetic of the self. 
 
3.1 Aesthetic of the self and freedom 
 
In general terms, Foucault's work can be described as         
concerned with an analysis of various power relations (religious,         
economical, social) and how we, as individuals, can confront these          
through an everlasting dialectic inspired, for the most, by two          
main concepts: the care of the self and freedom. 
Informed by an intense study of the systems of thought of the            
antiquities, the precept ​epimelesthai sautou​, "the care of the         
self", refers to a modus vivendi first appeared in the Greco-Roman           
philosophy of the first two centuries A.D. and re-interpreted in          
various manners until the Christian philosophy of the fourth and          
fifth century B.C. Originally, this precept was an invitation to          
speculative practices that helped in situating oneself in relation         
to others (the Greek city-State). Later, through Christian        
philosophy, it became a rule for asceticism, guilt and penitence,          
an attitude that, Foucault says, has informed Western societies         
until present times. 
 
It is the early interpretation of the precept, I argue, that           
presents interesting points of reflection in our discussion. 
 
The ​care of the self "constituted, not an exercise in          
solitude, but a true social practice"(Foucault 1988, 51), a mode          
of being to which every citizen of a polis (the ancient Greek            
polis) should commit to shape their conduct. It is not, however, a            
social rule or law to which everyone should submit to become a            
good citizen. The practice is primarily instigated by an         
autonomous initiative. To some, such as Socrates, it is a mission           
given by the gods. To others, such as Plato's Alcibiades, it is a             
prerequisite to embark on political activities. For the Romans it          
is a practice to embark on only after having abandoned politics. 
In all cases there is an emphasis on educating oneself. To           
use Foucault's words: "...there is the inducement to acknowledge         
oneself as being ill or threatened by illness. The practice of the            
self implies that one should form the image of oneself not simply            
as an imperfect, ignorant individual who requires correction,        
training, and instruction, but as one who suffers from certain          
ills and who needs to have them treated, either by oneself or by             
someone who has the necessary competence. Everyone must discover         
that he is in a state of need, that he needs to receive medication              
and assistance"(Foucault 1988, 57). 
 
In these terms, the care of the self becomes an ethical           
reflection on individual freedom (Foucault 2000, 284). It is a way           
of problematising one's freedom that results in visible ways of          
being and acting in a society. Thus, a person of admirable ethos            
was one who was admired for the way he practiced freedom (Foucault            
2000, 286). A practice perfected through the care of self. 
Within the historical context in which this precept first         
appeared, the speculative struggle of defining freedom consisted        
of finding a balance between avoiding to becoming subject to the           
power of others (i.e. becoming a slave) while also taking care not            
to abuse one’s power over others (i.e. despotic attitude)         
(Foucault 2000, 288). 
 
Foucault's analysis of the care of the self appears first in           
relation to a broader discussion concerned with the        
"problematization of aphrodisia" (Foucault 1988, 38) but the        
philosophising ethos of the precept is presented in his other          
works too. In his essay titled "What is Enlightenment", Foucault          
uses Kant to problematise the complex relation between "the theme          
of humanism with the questions of the Enlightenment (Foucault         
2000, 315) and states that this problematisation is necessary "to          
bring some measure of clarity to the consciousness that we have of            
ourselves and of our past"(ibid, 315). The philosophical ethos         
required by this process should consists of "a critique of what we            
are saying, thinking and doing through a historical ontology of          
ourselves" and "characterised ​by​ a limit-attitude"(ibid, 315). 
As for the problem of freedom then, the critical attitude          
towards the formation of an ontology of the self is not achieved            
by the knowing of formal universal or metaphysical transcendentals         
but through a reflection that, using speculative limits and         
possible transgression, aims at recognising ourselves "as subject        
of what we are doing, thinking and saying"(Foucault 2000, 315). 
 
All this, I argue, is useful for a problematisation of digital art            
practices to investigate one's relation to a creative activity         
constantly threatened by the objectifying forces of technology.        
Forces that, as explained in the previous chapter, nullify efforts          
towards an ontology of the (artistic) self that searches for          
individuality and authenticity. 
 
It is through the limit-critiquing-attitude of our       
relationship with, and use of, technology that we practice an          
exercise of freedom ultimately allowing for the formation of an          
artistic consciousness and a conscious artistic practice.       
Borrowing and recontextualising Mules' words, who carries a        
similar analysis of Foucault's work in general terms, "this         
exercise of freedom is the working through of the problem of           
having to be free posed in the practices that make human beings            
subject to their own objectification by technology"(Mules 2012,        
2). Problematising digital art practices under this light bare         
numerous consequences. Some, I admit, extreme. I will mention         
three of them. 
 I. Artistic practices relying on technology and inspired by the          
ethos of the care of the self become a problematisation of the            
concept of freedom. 
Problemitising one's relationship with the practice of digital art         
entails a problematisation of the self and freedom. Technology is          
not to be considered a mere tool for our artistic ends but a             
socio-technical landscape, one we have created and one we relate          
to. Technology is to be intended primarily as that landscape          
created and delimited by the work of the many people involved in            
its making. In that, technology is a space filled with          
psychological, sociological, ethical, political and technical      
elements, with which we unavoidably mix, by which our actions are           
conditioned. One, then, must reflect on the place they occupy          
within this ​technological polis​. One must engage in a critique of           
its rules by reasoning on the otherwise possibility of being in           
relation to it. It is within this practice of the self, not            
ascetic but speculative, that the social function of digital art          
(if you acknowledge one) is to be found. 
At this point, it is useful to explain the modalities through           
which the care of the self can take place. In his historical            
research, Foucault identifies four modes of engagement: the test         
of poverty, speculator sui, diakrisis and the principle of         
conversion to self. 
 
a) ​The test of poverty is "a way of measuring and confirming the             
independence one is capable of with regard to everything that is           
not indispensable and essential"(Foucault 1988, 59). For the        
Epicurean this meant fasting, for the Stoics depriving oneself         
from habits and opinions. In the digital domain it could be           
translated to a test seeking to find out how little technology we            
do need and how much superfluous technology we actually use. In           
simple terms, one could ask oneself: Is software X, its newest or            
older version, indispensable to my creative ends? Do I need a           
computer with 32GB of RAM? Or in more technically sophisticated          
terms: is memory allocation management an indispensable feature?        
What are the indispensable features in a language for the proper           
construction of one instruction? What are the bare minimum         
requirements to control a single LED? Or furthermore, in more          
theoretical terms: what kind of constrictions do imperative        
languages bring on creative practices? what are the psychological         
implications of functional programming? to what extent randomness        
represents a creative element within computers? 
 
 
b) "Speculator sui" refers to a reflective practice on the self.           
This practice is done not in imitation of a judicial procedure on            
infractions and it does not lead to self-castigation. Rather, it          
is a purely speculative work aimed at improving oneself (Foucault          
1988, 62). If in the antiquities this meant reflecting on the           
conduct of the self, with respect to digital art practices the           
precept could be interpreted as an invitation to reflect on the           
way we use (or are used), or abuse ( or are abused), (by)             
technology. For example, one could ask how much bias or logical           
constraints from others do we knowingly accept and use? How much           
of it is instead abusing us? 
 
c) Diakrisis consists in a work of discrimination of those mental           
representations that helps establish what does and what does not          
depend on us. It is a control point that enables us to accept that              
which comes under our understanding and reject that which does not           
depend on us. 
Foucault calls it a "test of power and guarantee of freedom"           
(Foucault 1988, 64) that helps us to not become attached to things            
not coming under our control and "to assess the relationship          
between oneself and that which is represented, so as to accept in            
the relation to the self only that which can depend on the            
subject's free and rational choice" (Foucault 1988, 64). 
In digital art practices, one must assess what to accept or reject            
from technology. One must accept or reject the biases given by the            
community involved in the making of it. Anything escaping this          
checkpoint is a threat to individual freedom and individuality. 
 
 
II. If the care of the self entails the self affirmation of the             
otherwise possibility of being in relation to technology then a          
close relationship with, and an understanding of, technology is         
essential. This entails not a sole grasp of the general principles           
governing it and its effects (undoubtedly important) but also an          
understanding of its mechanics in its most meticulous details,         
that is, code and the physical laws that governs it. digital art            
practices becomes then a gnoseological process (...) 
 
This does not mean that a comprehensive knowledge of technology is           
an priori requirement for the undertaking of an artistic practice.          
Rather, it means that through the practice of technology an          
insight into its mechanisms provides the fertile grounds for         
artistic endeavours. It is through this gnoseological/explorative       
process into technology that a reasoning of the otherwise         
possibilities of being in relation to it can take place. Thus,           
artists must speak the computer language, i.e. code, and possess          
an ability to make, assemble, tweak and talk to hardware. In other            
words, artists must also be expert technologists or, better,         
become one in the process. 
What defines the kind of digital art practice depicted here          
entails a deep-dive into the realm of technology. Technology is          
not to be looked at and analysed from a distance in its            
generalities and effects, nor simply used as it is given to us.            
Technology must be explored in its intricate roots. One must          
embark on a journey through its maze of complexity, understand and           
problematise its ways of being in relation to the self. 
 
 
III. ​An aesthetic of the self and freedom, as described so far,            
becomes an aesthetic of and for digital art. Contrary to          
aesthetics for which the artistic merits of a technological object          
of art lie primarily on some qualities to be found on the finish             
product (e.g. colourful, mesmerising, dreadful, hypnotic) or in        
the expressive relations it creates and affords , an aesthetic         
1
inspired by the ethos of the care of the self is concerned with             
the relation that one has to oneself to the creative processes           
originating it. It is concerned with the self-affirmation of the          
otherwise possibility of being in relation to technology. The         
evaluation of the artists' work will therefore be directed towards          
an analysis that highlights the gnoseological processes underlying        
the problematisation and re-consideration of the self in relation         
to technology, to others and to the creative process itself. 
 
This may lead us to think of digital art as a form of art              
different from others. 
 
Computer music, for example, is not to be considered a form of            
digital art if its goal is the creation of music. If so, computer             
music is simply music which uses a computer rather than a           
traditional instrument (both thought as tools while, as argued         
here, technology is to be seen as a ​polis​) and as such the subject              
can be dealt with through traditional aesthetics concerned with         
forms, grammars and perception. If we problematise instead the way          
in which technology enables us to generate sounds and we begin           
reasoning on the otherwise possibilities of being in relation to          
it, we begin exploring a territory other than music and we may be             
compelled, if inspired, to the generation of digital art that use           
sounds and yet, nevertheless, we may not be at ease in calling it             
music. Similar state of affairs could be said of computer visual           
(e.g. VJ performance) where the concern should not be the          
generation of graphics of certain proportions, beauty, ugliness or         
other qualities but a problematisation of the relation between the          
1
 For example, interactive art is often discussed in terms of the modalities 
and qualities of the relations established in the interaction between human 
and machine: propositive, imaginative, prosaic, narrativistic, gamic, 
enigmatic and so on. 
self and the technologically-mediated practice informing their       
generation. 
 
 
4 A Case-Example - Net.Art 
 
One would think that such an ethos informing digital art practices           
would belong to a distant utopian, possibly distopian to some,          
world. A world in which everyone (artists, audience, curators and          
critics) is deeply acquainted with the technology’s inner        
mechanics. Instead the reality is that many elements, past and          
present, suggest that there is a convergence towards this world.          
Critical code studies, for example, is a recent field of study           
that attempts to extract the socio-historical elements of coding         
practices. Art movements such as Futurism and Situationist        
International, to mention but a few, have dealt directly with the           
power of technology. The former by glorifying it and the latter by            
opposing it as source of alienation and commodity fetishism. There          
is however, one art movement in particular that, in my opinion,           
has come closer than others to the Foucaultian’s ethos described          
here. This is Net.Art.  
Net.art is an art movement born in the early 90’s and that            
remained active until the early 00’s when, swallow up by the same            
mainstream artworld (i.e. art galleries) who initially it fought         
against, slowly ceased its activity with each artist pursuing         
their individual interests. In Net.Art, a Foucaultian’s ethos        
emerges through two features in particular: its mode of work and           
its ideology. 
With regard to the modes of work, the relevant literature          
concerned with an historisation of net.art agrees on one point:          
net-art uses the internet browser as its primary tool of work and            
consumption. Indeed Net-art lives only on the Web and, as          
correctly pointed out by Greene, ”any net.art project seen out of           
their native HTML, out of their networked, social habitats, (is          
the) net.art equivalent of animal in zoos” (Greene 2000). While it           
is true that net artists were expressing themselves through this          
medium, I think their approach to its use went beyond considering           
it as a mere tool. Rather than using it, net artists explored            
networked technologies and the browser in particular. This        
exploration was both speculative and practical (i.e. conducted        
through the act of coding). Developed for reasons other than          
artistic, Internet was not a tool found and used but a new opening             
to a new technological world/space dense with possibilities. In         
line with the ethos of the care of the self and disinterested in             
the purely functional features of the medium, net artists         
interrogated the medium in its expressive capabilities in relation         
to the self. Their inquisitive attitude led them to an exploration           
of the internet structure and its coding syntax, re-structuring         
and re-imagining other possibilities of being in relation to it.          
Jodi’s use of HTML code is, in this case, emblematic in that code             
is used as ink to a canvas rather than as a set of instructions              
for the display of web pages. The resulting viewable page, then,           
is only a curtain hiding the real work and an invitation to unveil             
what lies behind it. Form Art by Shulgin re-imagines the use of            
prototypical HTML’s element such as buttons, text area, tables and          
check-boxes as drawing shapes (rather than purposeful objects for         
the navigation of webpages). Such approaches required net artists         
to be acquainted with coding grammar first and foremost with some           
of them, such as IOD, going as far as developing a web browser             
from scratch to bring attention to the dangerous and fast-moving          
standardisation processes in action. 
With regard to its ideology, net.art proclaims itself as a          
continuation of anti-establishment movements such as Dada and        
Situationist International. In common with those, net.art has an         
enemy: the high-brow art gallery world. Against it, net.art uses          
two features enabled by the browser: immediacy and immateriality         
(Greene 2000). The former is exemplified in the browser’s ability          
to provide immediate access to the artwork in any location          
connected to the web (i.e. the house as opposed to the gallery).            
The latter, immateriality, refers to the difficulty in controlling         
the spreading of the artwork because of living in a medium, the            
internet, whose control is distributed (at least it was so in its            
infancy). While this is certainly true, the anti-establishment        
sentiment of the movement moved quickly beyond the art gallery          
world and on to more general political territory. In this context,           
net artist problematised Internet as a technology destabilizing        
societal relationships and disrupting societal hierarchies. What       
emerges is a desire to investigate the operational modalities of a           
specific technology in relation to the self and existing power          
hierarchies. Similarly to the philosophers of the Greek polis         
then, who engaged in a speculative practice that helped situating          
oneself in relation to others, net artists problemitised the new          
dynamics and roles established by the new web-polis. In doing so,           
recurrent themes were online identity (Vatican.org by       
0100101110101101.ORG), hackerism (Documenta Done by Vuk Cusic),       
cyberfeminism (Cyberfeminist Manifesto by VNS) and political       
activism (Name.Space by Paul Garrin, Link X by Shulgin and          
Bounting, Heritage Gold by Mongrel). 
In light of the considerations above, I offer the following          
definition of Net.art: Net.art is an art movement problemitising         
the relation between the self, others and networked technologies         
through online detournements most often created for, and        
experienced through, a web browser. 
A Foucaultian ethos emerges in the non-acceptance of the internet          
medium for what it is and in the reasoning of the otherwise            
possibility of being in relation to and through it. In doing so,            
the merit of net.art is the recognition of technology not as a set             
of tool freely given but rather as a space dense with power            
struggles (very human ones) threatening freedom and individuality        
- powers that must be challenged and problematised through the          
very use and exploration of the tools through which they emerge,           
i.e. code. 
 
 
5 Considerations 
 ...the essence of the ​Tekne is by no means anything          
technological (Heidegger 1977, 4). 
 
Reconnecting with the short autobiographical account of the        
opening, how then would a Foucaultian ethos offer relief from          
frustration, enslavement and the silent death of creative energies         
in digital art practices? 
 
It can do so because: 
 
a) it interprets digital art practices as a gnoseological journey          
into technology intended as a world of power relations that needs           
to be problematised in order to speculate on the otherwise          
possibility of being in relation to it and the creative practice           
through it. Most importantly, the very essence of digital tools as           
facilitators and medium of self expression is to be problematised.          
It interrogates a widespread epistemological positivism informing       
digital art practices that, by interpreting technology as a mere          
tool, subjugates art to technological reason. A lack of such          
problematisation leads art discourses closer to positivist       
paradigms, more than what is probably desirable. 
 
b) it interprets creativity as a practice through which we ponder           
how to escape technology’s tautologies and objectifying forces.        
Being creative, then, means to think about the otherwise         
possibilities of being in relation to something (e.g. technology         
in our case), and one’s practice. 
I would like to conclude with two reflections: one concerning the           
modalities in which we can approach this practice and one          
concerning the similarities and differences that digital artists        
share with one group that appears to already be engaging in such            
practice: hackers. 
 
 
#1 - the entry point to the journey 
In the preceding sections, it was discussed how digital artists          
concerned with a problematisation of freedom in their own practice          
should engage in a work of discrimination, diakrisis, that enables          
for the acceptance of only what comes under their control. Such an            
approach bares two consequences. The first is that diakrisis, if          
intended as a propaedeutic phase to an art practice, would lead to            
a complete paralysis of action. Should this scrutiny be applied to           
each aspect of technology before embarking on digital art         
practises? Of course not. For example, net artists problematised         
the web browser without extending their scrutiny to the         
infrastructure enabling its existence (cabling, displays, RAM,       
memory, ports etc.). To do otherwise would mean to engage in a            
problematisation of technology as a whole, an attitude that, at          
large, already informs postdigital aesthetics (Berry Dieter 2015).        
Instead the entry point to this gnoseological journey is a narrow           
question regarding specific technologies and one’s relation to        
them. What this initial question should be can only be dictated by            
subjective interests or necessities. 
The second consequence of the precept concerns the mode of          
engagement. It is proposed that the conduct of this practice          
should not be solely speculative but also practical. It invites to           
work directly with technology and to engage in a research to the            
understanding of the relation between the self and some of its           
aspects. Thus, we must use and immerse ourselves in a          
technological world without exclusively engaging in speculative       
practices that requires us to distance ourselves from it. If we           
are to think in terms of users and creators of technology (a            
dichotomy said already to be weak), our practice would see us           
siding with the latter. How, though, can this be achieved? On this            
matter, I argue that the preferred (if not the only) entry point            
is offered by the open source community. It is within this           
community and its ethos that a large database of knowledge is           
collated, cherished and made publicly available. Its counterpart,        
close-source technology, precludes dialogue and enforces art       
practices onto the same standardisation processes characterising       
technology as a whole. Preferring it would mean to delegate the           
responsibility of defining one’s relation to technology over to         
others who, in turn, are not open about the decisions that they            
made for us. In other words, if art is dialogue, is there any             
point in inviting to the table someone who has openly declared to            
be not interested in sharing opinions?  
2
 
 
#2 - hacker or artist? 
Hackers’ work can be described as a problematisation of the          
otherwise possibilities of being in relation to technology, when         
the work is political, or as a speculative work on the otherwise            
possibility of being for technology, when the work is playful.          
From this perspective hackers are artists as much as artists          
engaging in the practice proposed here are hackers. If differences          
exist, or sought, they are likely be found in a) the way in which              
each group identifies itself b) the way in which the work of each             
group is discussed by third parties. 
In relation to identities, socio-historical elements play a major         
role. Traditionally, a hacker is thought of as an introverted,          
”geeky” individual interested in gaining the respect of their         
peers. An artist, on the other hand, is thought of as an            
extroverted individual, little inclined to rational thinking and        
driven by egotistical desires of fame. These generalisations are         
of course wrong on many fronts but, nevertheless, still play a           
role in forming two diverse group identities. 
 
More interesting is the way in which each group contextualises          
their own work and how this contextualisation interacts with third          
parties interested in its analysis (i.e. point b). In that respect           
a distinction between hackers and digital artists is that the          
former lacks the ability, or will, to contextualise their work          
within an aesthetic framework and dialogical discourse pertinent        
2 ​other than of course trying to convince them to act otherwise. 
to the arts. In that regard, the work of the Esoteric Programming            
Languages community (Esolang) is an interesting case. Their work         
is centered on a speculative discourse around the nature of          
programming languages. The purely provocative and purposeless       
nature of their work would provide excellent material for art          
critics. And indeed a first attempt is seen in Temkin’s recent           
paper titled ’Esolangs as Experiential Art’ (Temkin 2015).        
Undoubtedly, more conversations/exchanges would be highly      
desirable for the future. 
All in all, it is through an osmosis of both hacker and digital             
artists’ communities that a creative practice inspired by the         
ethos of the care of the self can emerge. Towards this end, it may              
be useful to highlight how both communities already have a key           
element in common - that is the urge to fight against different            
forms of agnotology, intended as ”the way in which computation          
facilitates a systemic production and maintenance of ignorance”        
(Berry and Dieter 2015, 5). A fight for the re-appropriation of           
subject status in relation to technology. A fight that for me, as            
a digital artist, represents an opportunity to foment creative         
energies, to understand my practice and a good chance, not a           
certainty, to find my art signature. 
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